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Abstract 
Research interest in educational governance has increased in recent years with the rise to 
prominence of transnational organisations such as the OECD and the importance attached 
to international comparison of educational systems. However, rarely do educational 
researchers consider the historical antecedents that have attended these developments. Yet 
to more fully appreciate where we are now it is necessary to examine the national and 
global events that have shaped the current policy context. This paper presents a review of 
educational governance in the UK from the 1970s seeing in this a trajectory from the 
emergence of accountability to today’s overriding concern with digital data.  In doing this, 
the paper aims to go beyond providing a historical account, rather its purpose is to shed 
light on educational change; and further, to analyse the contribution of educational 
research to an understanding of events as they have unfolded over the past five decades. 
While it is necessarily rooted within the particular historical context of the UK it can be read 
as an analysis of the factors influencing educational change in the context of globalised 
policy spaces more broadly. A recurrent theme is the appearance of the ‘unanticipated 
consequence’, one of the most important issues the social sciences has to contend with. 
Thus a tentative theory of ironic reversal as a source of policy failure emerges which is not 
only of relevance to educational policy but of wider significance. 
 
Introduction 
Since its rediscovery in the 1980s governance, or what is commonly referred to as the ‘new’ 
governance, has become ‘a hot topic for ivory tower academics’ (Jessop, 2003, p.101). 
Governance has been taken up and deployed in countless ways by academics across the 
various disciplines of the social sciences, becoming among other things ‘an approach, a 
theory and a perspective’ but also a buzzword, a fetish, a fad and, as a result of all this, an 
empty signifier (Levi-Faur, 2012, p.3). In fact, governance has become the subject of a fully-
fledged ‘turn’, assisted no doubt, by the very ambiguity that invariably attends the term. 
Within this turn education, and its successor ‘learning’ (Ozga et al, 2012, p.85), occupy a 
central role. Governance of national education systems has become a global concern but in 
addition governance, considered as an effect of networks, can itself be conceived as a 
process of learning.  
While consensus may be hard to achieve, as a starting point ‘new’ governance may be 
defined as,  
an account of social coordination in terms of the ways in which disparate actors 
within civil society come together in networks by means of dialogue and a sharing of 
resources. (Bevir and Trentmann, 2004, p.10) 
 
This conceptualisation of governance as a form of networking emerges in response to the 
complexity of modern systems of organisation, in which ‘multiple actors operating at 
different levels are more fluid and open to negotiation’ (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2016, p.17). As a result of this complexity the governance of 
education systems has become a policy priority centred around the key themes of 
accountability, capacity building, and strategic thinking (OECD, 2016). 
 
This paper constitutes a historical review of the research literature on educational 
governance in the UK compulsory education sector since the 1970s – and asks, at what point 
did a concern with governance begin to occupy educational researchers and why? In so 
doing I situate education within the wider domain of governance research in order to 
emphasise connections within the policy field more broadly; in this way I address the 
criticism that much educational research is divorced from wider social concerns (Ball, 1997). 
The paper is structured as follows. First, I trace the emergence of ‘the new governance’ 
(Peters, 2012). The etymology of governance is related to ‘steering’ – people can be steered 
by freedom to choose (Rhodes, 1996) hence, the governance turn is inextricably bound up 
with economic shifts evident in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the turn to neoliberalism 
and faith in the market. Next, I briefly set out the political context in which these new 
constructs of governance came to the fore in the UK education system before turning to an 
examination of the research literature from the 1970s to the present day. In doing this, the 
paper aims to go beyond providing a historical account, rather it aims to shed light on 
educational change, ‘as a phenomenon which is negotiated in an institutional context under 
pressure from economic, social and bureaucratic dynamics’ (Salter and Tapper, 1981, p.8); 
and further, to analyse the contribution of educational research to an understanding of 
events as they unfolded, tracing the trajectories of governance over the past five decades. 
So, while the paper is necessarily rooted within the particular historical context of the UK it 
can be read as an analysis of the factors influencing educational change in globalised policy 
spaces more broadly. A recurrent theme in the analysis that follows is the appearance of the 
‘unanticipated consequence’, which Merton (1936) regards as one of the most important 
issues the social sciences has to contend with. Thus, a tentative theory of ironic reversal as a 
source of policy failure emerges which is not only of relevance to educational policy but of 
wider significance. 
 
The turn to governance 
The prevalent narrative around the shift to neoliberalism in the global West has it that 
neocon think tanks, based around the thinking of economists such as Friedrich von Hayek 
and Milton Friedman, were only biding their time waiting for the most propitious moment 
to persuade politicians that the fundamentally self-correcting nature of markets would 
ensure not only the most efficient way of providing goods and services but also morally the 
most equitable way of doing so. Such a moment presented itself with the apparent failure of 
Keynesian Welfarism in the 1970s, which had centred on the belief (misappropriated from 
Keynes) that interventionist governments could spend their way out of recession. In 
opposition to this advocates of neoliberalism argued for a rolling back of the functions of 
the state thereby leaving organisations free to pursue their interests unfettered by 
government interference. Neoliberalism, especially in these early days of ‘experimental 
proto-neoliberalism’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.384) is thus associated with aspirations to 
reduce both the size of government and its reach (Cahill, 2013). 
However, it is apparent that far from reducing the role of the State, neoliberalism has 
resulted in the expansion of government and the extension of governance into the global 
sphere This, as Levi-Faur and Jordana (2005) point out, is the paradox of neoliberalism (and 
a monument to the law of unintended consequences). However, Peck and Tickell (2002, 
p.384) caution against a simplistic view which sees neoliberalism as either ‘monolithic in 
form or universal in effect’. They point to a complex evolution, from its inception in the 
1970s, through the aggressive ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ of the 1980s  to ‘an ascendant 
moment of “roll-out” neoliberalism’, followed by the ‘soft’ neoliberalism that underpinned 
the Third Way politics of successive UK New Labour governments of the 2000s (leading 
these authors, perhaps prematurely, to argue that neoliberalism has become ‘naturalised’): 
In the course of this shift, the agenda has gradually moved from one preoccupied 
with the active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-
collectivist institutions (broadly defined) to one focused on the purposeful 
construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, 
and regulatory relations. (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.384) 
 
Arguably, it is the shift to a focus on ‘regulatory relations’ – and more especially the 
complexity brought about by regulation at a distance – that has been responsible for the 
rise to prominence of governance as a theory of political science. The ‘new’ governance is 
widely understood as a response to the failure of both top down command and control 
government and unregulated markets. Lobel (2012, p.67) argues that increased 
participation of non-state actors is recognition of the complexity of modern polities and the 
need to draw on a range of expertise and ‘create internal norms' among a range of 
stakeholders. Public-private collaboration, diversity, and decentralisation follow from this 
initial premise.  In this new governance model ‘individuals are norm-generating subjects 
involved in the process of developing and changing the norms of behaviour, in contrast to 
the traditional model, under which private actors are the objects of regulation’ (Lobel, 2012, 
p.67). This model requires actors to be adaptable and engaged in a constant process of 
learning, steered by ‘soft laws’ and non-coercive means aimed at participation and dialogue. 
The ‘new governance’ can therefore be positioned as an aid to a flourishing democracy, in 
which regulation becomes a collective endeavour. In this system ‘power is not so much a 
matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of “making up” citizens capable of bearing a 
kind of regulated freedom’ (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.174). The emergence of regulatory 
regimes supported by these conceptualisations of governance does indeed suppose a 
naturalised and somewhat benign neoliberalism, its true intent obscured to all (with the 
exception of dyed-in-the-wool Bourdieusian academics, naturally). Governance thus 
operationalises the regulatory functions of the neoliberalised state and hence governance 
and neoliberalism are intricately entangled and co-emergent. 
Moving towards governance 
The 1970s was a paradoxical decade characterised by political instability, industrial unrest 
and an overall sense that we were going down the pan but also by indulgence, lack of 
surveillance, and a certain innocence. The Conservative government, led by Edward Heath, 
was in office from 1970-1974. During this time the UK joined the European Economic 
Community and things ticked along nicely until the oil crisis of 1973/74, caused by the 
embargo of oil exports imposed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
on countries deemed to have supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War (1973). The embargo 
resulted in a severe shock to the economy. So severe, indeed, that from January to March 
1974 much of the UK workforce was placed on a ‘3-day week’. The election called by Heath 
in February 1974 produced no overall control and a minority Labour government was 
formed under Harold Wilson. A second election followed in October of the same year giving 
Wilson a slender majority of three. Wilson unexpectedly stepped down in 1976 and James 
Callaghan became prime minister (PM). Having by this time lost his majority he was forced 
into an arrangement with the Liberal party known as the ‘Lib Lab Pact’ (1977-1978). This 
lasted until 1979 which saw the election of Conservative PM Margaret Thatcher. 
There is a metaphoric (if illusory) neatness in being able to ascribe a ‘turn’ to a crisis. The 
crisis which gave birth to the governance turn in the UK was one of both legitimation and 
rationality (Habermas, 1973) as played out in the 1970s and particularly in the dying days of 
the Labour Callaghan administration (1976-1979). Ball (1997) berates education researchers 
for a myopic tendency to see education as somehow unconnected to other areas of 
social/economic policy but in the crises that beset the UK in the 1970s the involvement of 
education was hard to ignore.  That knowledge as a commodity is what secures economic 
success is one of the ‘modern myths’ that underpin education policy (O’Hagan, 1999). It 
follows then that ‘if the economy was in decline education had demonstrably not come up 
with the goods’ (Troman, 1989, p.280). This intensified the doubts that had begun to 
circulate around education and the ‘progressive theories’ popularly supposed to have taken 
hold in State comprehensive schools, in England and Wales at least, in the 1960s.  
This apparent failure of the education system resulted in a crisis of legitimation. But further, 
since the government was forced to make cuts to public expenditure, of which education 
had to bear its share, following the humiliating $3.9 billion loan from the International 
Monetary Fund in 1976,  there arose a crisis of rationality which demanded that education 
would have to deliver more with less (a familiar mantra).  As Troman observes, if ‘economic 
retrenchment’ was foisted on an unwilling Callaghan, it was taken up with alacrity by the 
Thatcher government that inevitably followed the industrial unrest of the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ (1978-9) during which the end of Welfarism was metaphorically and powerfully 
enacted  as the dead went unburied and rubbish piled up in the streets. Habermas 
characterises capitalism as an inherently crisis-driven process in which solutions to problems 
inevitably create new problems. Crises in this sense herald (temporary) salvation and for 
education this salvation was to be found with the alignment of rationality and legitimation 
in moves towards increased regulatory control which required a profound shift in systems of 
governance.  
This then provides the starting point for the analysis presented here which examines trends 
in the educational research literature around issues of governance in the UK education 
system over the past five decades.  
 
Governance in the 1970s: the rise of accountability 
There is little use of the term ‘governance’ in any UK education research journal in the 
1970s, and where it is used it tends to be applied at the institutional level of the school. 
What is evident, however, is a growing concern with accountability, a key theme in present 
day constructs of governance (OECD, 2016).  By the end of the 1970s Halpin (1979, p.199) 
notes that accountability had ‘become one of education’s new catchwords’. A sentiment 
echoed by MacDonald (1979) and Watson (1978). There was, Halpin (1979) asserts, a 
consensus at all levels of the education system that schools and teachers should be 
accountable for their actions. However, beyond this there was little agreement as to what 
form such accountability should take, to what or whom it should be directed, or even 
around the meaning of the word itself.  Where policy-makers tend to gloss over such 
niceties as this educationists take a more nuanced view. Halpin’s article focuses on the 
distinction between ‘offering an account’ and ‘being accountable’. The former, Halpin 
argues, is ‘akin to being answerable [and] does not necessarily entail liability to sanction, 
whereas the latter is of quite a different order – it wants to know if certain obligations have 
been met, and does entail potential liability to sanction’ (Halpin, 1979, p.201). Policy neatly 
elides these meanings in the service of legitimation.  
Although the ‘accountability movement’ (MacDonald, 1974) took hold in the 1970s it did 
not start there. Like much else, the concept came to us from America where ‘management 
by objectives’ had become familiar practice in the private and public sectors in the 1960s 
(Kogan, 1984). In the UK this trend became evident in a number of moves designed to end 
the amateurish nature and secrecy of many of the UK’s most cherished institutions. Thus, 
for example, the Fulton Report on the Civil Service advocated the introduction of principles 
of 'accountable management'. According to which ‘the performance of individuals (or units) 
is measured as objectively as possible, and those individuals (or units) are then held 
responsible for tasks they have performed’ (HMSO, 1968).  Unfortunately, many of the 
recommendations of the Fulton Report found resistance among the very group who were 
required to implement them and hence much of its force was lost (Kellner and Crowther-
Hunt, 1981). Similar recommendations emerged from the Bains Committee report 
(HMSO,1972) on local authority restructuring but were more successfully executed. Bains 
advocated greater corporate planning by local government and ‘management by 
objectives’, under the central control  of the Chief Executive. An almost ‘carbon copy’ of the 
recommendations was produced in Scotland in the Paterson Report (HMSO, 1973, cited in 
Minogue, 1977).   
These moves were widely perceived as posing a threat to the traditional autonomy of the 
chief education officer (Barnes, 1975; Blowers, 1977).  At a time of plenty such concerns 
might not have arisen but in the straitened circumstances in which many local authorities 
found themselves opposition to restructuring was more vociferous. MacDonald (1979) 
argues that the context for accountability management shifted  from, ‘a means of informing 
uncontested investments and facilitating cooperative planning with other services to an 
unsympathetic audit of coveted expenditure’ (p.10). This, he suggests, is important in 
understanding why many of those initially sympathetic towards the introduction of 
accountable management procedures subsequently turned against it. 
On the other hand, the narrowly instrumental understanding of accountability as set out in 
the Bains Report led some eminent educationists (MacDonald cites among these Michael 
Eraut and John Elliott) to reject this ‘early managerial prototype’ (MacDonald, 1979, p.3). 
The antecedents of what came to be known as the New Public Management are clearly set 
out by Barnes (1975, p.15): 
[corporate management] involves the application to education of management 
methods derived from other spheres and requiring the definition of objectives, 
progress towards which can be quantified within a short period of time. It requires a 
search for performance indicators which can be expressed arithmetically. And it 
carries the implication that the best people to devise, and perhaps to operate, new 
techniques of this kind are likely to be found outside the educational world, their 
ignorance of the atmosphere of schools and the traditions of the teaching profession 
being irrelevant or, in the view of extremists, positively advantageous. 
However, as the decade and the concept developed, MacDonald (1979, p.1), says, 
‘accountability based on openness of process as an alternative to specification of product’ 
found greater favour among educationists. Thus, MacDonald advocated a process model of 
school accountability centred on school ‘self report’. Though he recognised that self 
reporting was generally regarded as of ‘low credibility’ in terms of the professional 
accountability of schools and teachers, it had merits and was, he argued, ‘a long overdue 
social invention’. Elliott (1977, p.103) also took the view  that ‘Public accountability implies 
that the evaluated are obliged to evaluate themselves’.  In the late 70s the idea of self-
evaluation was still a pioneering concept not yet taken up by policy-makers as a key 
instrument of performativity.   
Elliott (1979, p.23) contended that the rationale for self-evaluation could be argued on three 
grounds which he referred to as social, economic and professional accountability. Social 
accounting is concerned with curriculum policies and ‘social acceptability’; economic 
accounting concerns pupil performance and ‘economic acceptability’; while professional 
accounting centres on pedagogies and ‘educational acceptability’. Social and professional 
accountability, Elliott argued, were not necessarily antagonistic, requiring the kinds of 
qualitative ‘illuminative evaluation’ (Parlett and Hamilton, 1972) which had come to the fore 
in the 1970s. Economic accountability however required schools ‘to see themselves as 
factories manufacturing clearly defined and measurable outputs in the form of “learning 
outcomes”’ (Elliott, 1979, p.23). Economic accountability he argued, was incompatible with 
these other forms of self-evaluation and likely to produce ‘a distorting effect…in a context of 
economic accountability the educative quality of teaching becomes an irrelevance’ (p.25). 
MacDonald (1978) too offered a trenchant critique of what he termed ‘technocratic 
accountability’ describing this as a ‘tunnel to dystopia’ in which reductive measures of 
school output divorce schools from both the learning process and educational critique. 
However, it seems the government was in no mood to adopt more ‘sensible’ models of 
accountability (MacDonald, 1978) and the general feeling of dissatisfaction stoked up by 
politicians around the failure of the education system served to legitimate the 
technocratic/economic approach.  
To some extent, academics could be regarded as contributing to this confusion around 
forms of accountability which played into the hands of the policy-makers for whom such 
proliferation of meaning is, if not exactly a virtue, certainly a convenience.  MacDonald 
(1979, p.1) notes dryly, that accountability as a concept is  ‘susceptible to competing 
ideological suppositions’  a susceptibility which continues to inhabit (some might say 
‘infect’) the term to this day.  
As the 1970s progressed, other concerns emerged that lent themselves to the accountability 
movement in education. Many of these were expressed in James Callaghan’s Ruskin Speech 
which inaugurated the ‘Great Debate’ on education and signalled a change in the direction 
of Labour thinking around education. Callaghan (1976) said, 
…there is the unease felt by parents and others about the new informal methods of 
teaching which seem to produce excellent results when they are in well-qualified 
hands but are much more dubious when they are not…My remarks are not a clarion 
call to Black Paper1 prejudices. We all know those who claim to defend standards but 
who in reality are simply seeking to defend old privileges and inequalities… It is not 
my intention to become enmeshed in such problems as whether there should be a 
basic curriculum with universal standards–although I am inclined to think there 
should be… 
As Ginsburg et al (1979) note, the ‘Great Debate’ was framed in such a way that it prevented 
discussion around the aims and purposes of education in the current context. In this sense it 
was neither a Debate – nor was it particularly Great – but this is a familiar ploy of politicians 
engaged in ‘consultation’.   Instead Callaghan focused on ways to secure the ‘improvements’ 
needed to meet the needs of industry – greater centralised control, a core curriculum, 
monitoring, and national standards and assessments. Bogdanor (1979) argues that a major 
aim of the Great Debate was to enable the Department for Education and Science (DES) to 
regain control over curriculum and examinations. This control had been delegated to the 
Schools Council2 which, ‘dominated as it was by the teachers’ associations, had been unable 
to evolve a coherent policy on examinations which could secure general approval 
(Bogdanor, 1979, p.162).  
The Great Debate was followed by the Green Paper Education in Schools: A Consultative 
Document (HMSO, 1977a). In the Green Paper, accountability is squarely concerned with 
pupil performance  and a ‘Growing recognition of the need for schools to demonstrate their 
accountability to the society which they serve [through] a coherent and soundly based 
means of assessment for the educational system as a whole, for schools, and for individual 
pupils’ (HMSO, 1977a, p.16).  A different slant on the accountability movement was 
provided by the Taylor Report (HMSO, 1977b), A New Partnership for Our Schools, which 
largely saw the issue of accountability in terms of changes to school governing bodies and 
the need for increased representation of parents and the wider community on school 
boards.  Though widely cited the Taylor Report drew a mixed response, with Owen (1978, 
p.37) noting that it ‘gives the impression of describing the Emperor’s clothes. Is there much 
new to be said?’ It is true that the Taylor Report was not the first to examine the 
relationship between schools and parents (the issue of greater parental partnership had 
formed a major plank of the earlier Plowden Report, HMSO,1967). However, what was new 
was the challenge it presented to the professional autonomy of teachers in proposing that 
parents have a greater say in setting the aims of the school and in matters of the curriculum.  
With the benefit of hindsight, Bridges (1994, p.67) concluded that ‘The Taylor Report was a 
wise and carefully balanced document, which deserved more sustained government support 
than it was in the end to receive’. Its misfortune was to report at a time of political change 
with its key messages being open to a different interpretation by the Conservative 
Government that came to power in 1979. In any event, Taylor admitted that where his 
proposals had been implemented ‘they have created more difficulties than opportunities’ 
(quoted in Bennett, 1984, p.162).  
The Taylor Report rehearsed the now familiar theme around the need for more openness in 
British institutions (as both the Fulton and Bains reports had done). The charge of secrecy 
had also been directed towards national government. The growing concern with 
accountability was given added impetus as a result of an OECD report published in 1975 
which was highly critical of the DES and its arcane policy-making, advocating more open and 
democratic approaches. The DES responded by ‘fashioning a change of role for the 
traditionally secretive and largely advisory inspectorate’ (MacDonald, 1979,p.18), upping 
the ante by publishing evaluations, and expanding the work of the Assessment of 
Performance Unit (APU) established in 1974 to monitor teaching standards. In this way, with 
some irony, the greater openness advocated by the OECD paved the way for more 
centralised control. 
An additional justification for government action around perceived standards was provided 
by the notorious 1996  ‘William Tyndale affair’. William Tyndale was  a primary school in 
Islington whose ‘radical’ teaching methods led to parent protests – a response, which 
MacDonald (1979, p.18) suggests constituted ‘an unprecedented threat to public apathy’. 
The William Tyndale affair illustrated all too graphically how ‘the pursuit of national 
economic goals could not be merely ignored but actually frustrated in a system where clear 
central leadership was absent’ (Dale, 1981, p.310). The events were subsequently narrated 
as instrumental in the turn to government control over the curriculum.3 The twin pressures 
exerted by government and parents, produced, MacDonald (1979) argues, ‘a conceptual 
and operational confusion between the notion of accountability as a condition of autonomy 
and the notion of power-sharing as an expression of accountability’ (p.18). Certainly, there 
was an ideological slipperiness around the term which enabled Watson (1978) to comment 
favourably that: 
The concept is undoubtedly linked with those of democratization, political rights, 
and demands by parental pressure groups such as the Home-School council and 
various Parent Teacher Associations for greater involvement in and even control of 
education. (Watson, 1978, p.10) 
Conversely, others saw it as a means by which government might exert unwarranted control 
over the teaching profession and as threat to the traditional autonomy of the ‘head master’ 
(Boynton, 1975, p.11). 
Parental choice 
As the Taylor report noted, closely entwined with issues of accountability was a concern 
with parental involvement in schools. However, this could also be construed within different 
discourses. Thus, as Bogdanor (1976) notes,  calls for parental involvement took  two forms: 
greater participation and  say for parents in the governance of education through more 
open access to information and representation on school boards, as advocated in the Taylor 
Report; and the positioning of parents as consumers in moves towards marketisation of  the 
education system, particularly through the appeal to  ‘parental choice’. In the US a major 
debate was taking place around the introduction of voucher schemes as a means to 
operationalise parental choice driven, as in the UK, through concern with declining 
standards (Mason, 1975). It was commonly claimed that such ideas gained ground in the US 
due to the crisis sparked by the launch of the Russian satellite, Sputnik, signalling a hitherto 
unthinkable superiority in Russian technological capability. The introduction of voucher 
schemes was predicated on the ideas expressed in  Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and 
Freedom (1962) that ‘Schools should be denationalized and subject to classical market place 
theories of demand and supply’ (Mason, 1975, p.161). A Friedman-style unfettered market 
was never envisaged however, even in the USA, with various models proposed each 
embodying different degrees and types of market manipulation. At no time were such 
schemes touted in the UK as a serious proposition, though Kent LEA carried out a feasibility 
study (Hansard, 1978). Seldon (1979) reports on this favourably, and interestingly argues 
that the scheme was favoured by a number of Labour academics but was vetoed by the 
then Labour Education Secretary, Shirley Williams. More surprisingly vouchers were not 
implemented by the incoming Conservative Education Secretary, Keith Joseph, despite his 
‘messianic’ support for the idea (Chitty, 1997a); Joseph was apparently persuaded that the 
same results could be achieved by other means (West, 1982, np). 
Ironically perhaps, the whole issue of parental choice only came to the fore with the 
introduction of the comprehensive system. Judge (1979) argues that prior to comprehensive 
secondary education (introduced in 1965) the selective 11+ examination had largely taken 
choice out of parents’ hands. Though Judge notes that parental choice might be seen as 
undermining the aims of comprehensive education by widening the gap between good and 
bad schools, in certain local authorities in England parents were permitted to list schools in 
rank order. Although in some areas most parents received their first choice in others Benn 
(1974, p.68) notes with some cynicism what she refers to as ‘guided parental choice’: 
“guided” because only certain parents' choices—certainly for the academic 
comprehensives—can be honoured’. In any case, as Judge notes, the choice lay between 
good and bad and did not extend to choice over the kind of education provided which was 
moving, under James Callaghan’s premiership, towards a more centralised approach with 
greater government control over the curriculum (Ginsburg et al, 1979). Even Conservative  
policy of the 1970s (while in opposition) did not go this far, regarding the proper 
responsibility of government as ‘maintaining a continuous watch on the whole education 
system’ while having ‘no direct responsibility for what is taught in schools’ (Bogdanor, 1976, 
p.122). 
 
The 1970s: summary 
What emerges from the literature in the 1970s is an intensity around the question of ‘Who 
should control our schools?’ (Glatter, 1976). This followed a lengthy period of relatively 
benign neglect of educational policy under the 1944 Education Act during which time it was 
assumed that ‘to give clear definition to the powers and rights of different bodies is 
undesirable, that vagueness and lack of definition usually “works”’ (Glatter, 1976, p.51). This 
vagueness distributed responsibility between local education authorities (LEAs), governors 
and school heads, but as MacDonald argues, this desirable dispersion of powers was already 
under assault in the 1960s with moves to more corporate or entrepreneurial models 
following the expansion of local government. This gave rise to the ‘accountability 
movement’ which replaced a paternalistic obfuscation with a more muscular technocratic 
efficiency, in keeping with a renewal of emphasis on economic need. What is evident in the 
development of the accountability movement is the formation of a ‘chain of equivalence’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) aligning those who saw it as a means to exert control over the 
education system and those who saw it as an aid to democratisation, which resulted in the 
dissolution of conflict in the coalescence of opposites. 
 
The Conservative years 1979-1990: education in the market place 
The end of the political consensus that had prevailed from the 1944 Education Act to the 
1960s, coupled with the economic crisis of the 1970s provided the incoming Thatcher led 
Conservative administration in 19794 with the rationale for a radical programme of change 
which with hindsight has been narrated as the embrace of neoliberalism and the rolling back 
of the state. In setting out Conservative thinking while in opposition Bogdanor (1976, p.120) 
argued that central government had become ‘overloaded’, ‘clogged up with the huge 
variety of problems it is expected to solve’. Moreover, he went on, it is a mistake to assume 
that central government ‘possesses some special knowledge or expertise enabling it to 
decide priorities for the whole country’. It follows from this reasoning that decision-making 
should be devolved from the centre. Crucially however, Bogdanor argues, LEAs were 
themselves implicated in the evident collapse of educational standards and were 
responsible for ‘widespread popular alienation’ (p.112) from local government. This 
necessitated increased accountability of LEAs that was to be achieved by two measures: 
monitoring of standards (including appraisal of performance); and measures to increase 
parental influence as the ‘consumers’ of education. This move to greater accountability thus 
provided the rationale for changes to governance structures, with central government 
holding local authorities to account for educational performance. 
The essentials of Conservative ideology were set out in the campaign manifesto…  
We will halt the Labour government's policies which have led to the destruction of 
good schools; keep those of proven worth; and repeal those sections of the 1976 
Education Act which compel local authorities to reorganise along comprehensive 
lines and restrict their freedom to take up places at independent schools.  
We shall promote higher standards of achievement in basic skills. The Government's 
Assessment of Performance Unit will set national standards in reading, writing and 
arithmetic, monitored by tests worked out with teachers and others and applied 
locally by education authorities. The Inspectorate will be strengthened. In teacher 
training there must be more emphasis on practical skills and on maintaining 
discipline. 
 
Extending parents' rights and responsibilities, including their right of choice, will also 
help raise standards by giving them greater influence over education. Our Parents' 
Charter will place a clear duty on government and local authorities to take account 
of parents' wishes when allocating children to schools, with a local appeals system 
for those dissatisfied. Schools will be required to publish prospectuses giving details 
of their examination and other results. (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, no date) 
 
These election promises were enacted in the 1980/81 Education and Education (Scotland) 
Acts.  As has been widely commented on by educational researchers, the construct of the 
consumer underpins the ideology of these Acts. Granting parents the right to express a 
preference for the school attended and basing this choice on the provision of information by 
the school including examination results, effectively created a market and marginalised LEAs 
without creating the need for a voucher system.5  
 
Although somewhat more common than in the 1970s the term ‘governance’ is still little 
used in the UK research literature of the 1980s. Concern remains focused on accountability, 
but there is a clear shift in the meaning attached to the term. Thus, Ranson (1986) argues 
that the 1980/81 Acts embodied ‘the assumptions of the market-place…Legislation enacted 
a distinctive form of accountability with the public conceived as consumers whose 
preference would improve the effectiveness of schools’ (p.96). The shift to market 
accountability from professional  accountability inevitably altered the relationship between 
schools and parents from client (subjected to the views and judgements of experts) to 
individual consumer. 
The 1980 Act increased direct control and regulation of LEAs by the DES. Ranson (1985) 
comments that ‘the conjunction of extending the principles of “hierarchy” and “markets”  
has the designed effect of undermining the authority of the key partner of the past – the 
LEA’ (Ranson, 1985, p.68). Thus, the government took back powers from the LEAs while at 
the same time demanding greater performative accountability.  In this way, the 1980 Act 
constructed a paradoxical mix of ‘centralising and decentralising instruments’ which shifted 
regulation and in effect inaugurated the era of ‘new’ governance in all but name.  (Ranson 
asks whether this shift was decisive, and concludes that we might have to wait a little to find 
out – with hindsight we can probably say that it was).  
As part of the move towards marketisation of the system, the 1980 Act required schools and 
LEAs to provide more information to support parental choice of school. However, Munn 
(1985) asserts that the additional information to be provided to parents was of little interest 
to them.  She reports on three research projects carried out in the late 1970s, all of which 
concluded that ‘parents seem content to delegate to teachers decisions on a whole range of 
matters concerning schooling on the grounds of teachers’ expertise’ (p.106). Evidently, 
parents did not, at this stage, see themselves as consumers of education. However, Munn 
also says there were indications that perceptions around teacher expertise could inhibit 
parental challenge. Further, Ginsburg et al (1988) point to media coverage around this time 
which questioned teacher competence, offering this as ‘an explanation of falling standards’ 
(Ginsburg et al, 1988, p.329). Together, these factors created a tension which was 
effectively exploited by the market ideology producing ‘a hothouse atmosphere of parents’ 
rights’ which furthered demands for accountability and encouraged ‘teachers to seek refuge 
in their professional expertise as a means of safe-guarding their autonomy’ (Munn 1985, 
p.108). The mistrust generated between increasingly entrenched sides (exacerbated by 
teacher unrest and industrial action) served to create a desire for more information, 
including the publication of league tables, where none had apparently existed before 
(Ginsburg et al, 1988). Munn concludes, ‘by placing schools in direct competition with each 
other and emphasising parents’ rights, it places home-school relationships in a combative 
framework…Far from promoting effective home-school communication, therefore, recent 
legislation is actively constraining it’ (Munn, 1985, p.110).  
 
The 1980 Act in England also contained provision for parents to become members of school 
governing boards  (in Scotland this had to wait until the 1981 Act). This was extended in the 
Green Paper, Parental influence at school: a new framework of School Government in 
England and Wales (DES, 1984), which proposed that parents should be in the majority.  
Bennett (1984) points to the apparently paradoxical mix of central control and ‘parental 
freedom’ set out in the  Green Paper  which in effect created, he claimed,  ‘an alternative 
line of accountability’ set against central government  (Gray and Bennett, 1984, cited in 
Bennett, 1984, p.162). However, this ostensibly democratising move by government had the 
desired effect of further marginalising LEAs (Kogan, 1984). 
The extent to which parents welcomed these extra powers, certainly at this time, is unclear. 
In fact, the more far-reaching proposals set out in the Green Paper were rejected. 
Hammond (1986, p.136) says, ‘this rejection, coming as it did from some 4,000,000 parents, 
did much to change Sir Keith [Joseph’s] mind’. Less radical proposals were set out in the 
subsequent White paper, Better Schools (DES, 1985), in which parents formed the largest 
group, though not the majority on the board. But if government wanted to use parents as a 
means to push forward their own agenda they may have been disappointed. In an empirical  
study Pascal (1988) investigated the role of parents as school governors over a 3-year period 
between 1981 and 1984 in a sample of Birmingham primary schools.  Pascal reports that 
parents saw their role as largely ‘procedural’, providing support for the school, with little 
involvement in matters of curriculum or what Elliott (1977) would call ‘social accountability’, 
still seen as the preserve of the profession. Though most parents felt they made a positive 
contribution, Pascal (1988, p.20) concludes that boards ‘are struggling to make any real 
impact’.  
Why was the profession apparently ready to accept these changes to their professional 
standing and relationships? Ginsburg et al (1988) examined the prevailing conditions under 
which these changes in relations between teachers and the State occurred over the period 
1976 to 1981,  commenting on the importance of ‘events’ in shaping outcomes. Key here 
was falling school rolls which increased competition between schools and threatened jobs: 
Given the consequences of this for reduction in staff, teachers seemed to opt for 
being held accountable rather than trying to maintain authority and risk the threat of 
redeployment or total job loss. (Ginsburg et al, 1988, p.331) 
Where teachers mobilised this was in response to jobs rather than changes to 
professional standing or conditions of employment.  
Changes to the curriculum 
The white paper Better schools (DES, 1985) (which formed the basis of the 1986 Education 
Act) formally set out the government’s intentions to take control over what was to be 
taught in schools, employing the traditional policy tactic of reference to ‘widespread’ 
(though unspecified) agreement: 
Consultations with the Government's partners in the education service and with 
other interests have shown that there is widespread acceptance of the need to 
improve the standards achieved by pupils, and of the proposition that broad 
agreement about the objectives and content of the school curriculum is a necessary 
step towards that improvement. (p.9) 
The argument for a national curriculum was ostensibly centred around the need to raise 
standards by a return to a traditional subject focus and to meet the needs of industry. These 
moves towards centralised control of the curriculum had been coming a long time, Jim 
Callaghan himself having referred to it in the Great Debate in 1976. Bennett (1984, p.158) 
reports that ‘shadows’ were already visible in the 1981 policy document The School 
Curriculum (DES, 1981) and goes on, ‘but it has now been outlined clearly [by] the Secretary 
of State…with the promise that colouring in will start this autumn’. Bennett comments on 
the regressive nature of these reforms by quoting the Hadow Report of 1931 which had 
stated that: 
the curriculum is to be thought of in terms of activity and experience rather than of 
knowledge to be acquired and facts to be stored. (Board of Education, 1931, p.93) 
Although the 1986 Act set in motion the events which tightened central control over what 
was to be taught in schools it was the Great Education Reform Bill (or ‘GERBILL’, as it was 
waggishly known) and the subsequent Education Reform Act (more prosaically the ‘ERA’) 
(1988) which consolidated these moves (DES, 1988). Thus, Bennett (1984, p.158) displays 
considerable prescience in his comment that: 
It appears that the education service which takes us into the 1990s will be organised 
on a centre-periphery model. The DES will lay out national statements of 
achievement targets and learning goals, cast in terms of core subjects (English, 
mathematics, science, foreign languages)…Within this core, as well as elsewhere, this 
framework is intended to include specific objectives for each subject. However, this 
national framework is not intended to tell teachers how to teach…Schools then are 
required to set their own aims and objectives, and monitor their achievement. 
The Bill proposed that testing (at 7,11,14 and 16) would, in non-examined subjects, largely 
rely on teacher assessments carried out ‘as an integral part of normal classroom work’ 
alongside prescribed tests (para 29.) Broadfoot (1987) questioned the feasibility of such an 
approach – in terms of both the construction of suitably valid and robust tests and the 
practicality of their administration – and concludes that given the attendant difficulties, the 
suspicion must be that ‘the real purpose of the tests lies elsewhere. That at the heart of the 
proposals is not the accurate assessment of individual pupil achievement but the 
reinforcement of procedures for surveillance and control through a discourse of 
competition and accountability’ (Broadfoot, 1987, p.17).  Broadfoot accurately predicted the 
ensuing chaos as teachers attempted to carry out assessments as part of their ‘normal’ 
classroom activities  (resulting in a move to reliance on norm-referenced benchmark testing, 
which Margaret Thatcher was known to favour). However, her prognosis that ‘it is doubtful 
whether such a policy could be imposed indefinitely against concerted professional 
opposition and perhaps substantial parental disquiet as well’ (p.17) has since proved wide of 
the mark. 
As well as the introduction of a National Curriculum and objectives to be met at a number of 
‘key stages’ the ERA also introduced a range of changes, mainly concerned with devolved 
financial arrangements, which further undermined the role of LEAs (and the Act took the 
opportunity to abolish the troublesome Inner London Education Authority). Most 
significantly these were: the local management of schools (LMS) which devolved budgets, 
using a per capita funding formula, to schools under the control of the headteacher and 
board of governors (similar legislation was extended to Scotland); grant maintained (GM) 
schools, funded directly by central government (determined by parental ballot); and city 
technology colleges (CTCs), focusing on vocational skills and  ‘sponsored’ by businesses 
(widely reported as modelled on US ‘magnet schools’).   The Assisted Places Scheme, 
enabling academically selected pupils to attend independent schools was expanded and 
both GM schools and CTCs were allowed to select a proportion of students based on 
‘aptitude and ability’. All these measures were intended to extend the market-place for 
education by offering choice, not just of school, but of type of education provided, and to 
reduce the power of the LEAs, thereby consolidating the changes to governance of the 
system. In this way specialisation, casuistically, provided cover for a return to greater 
selectivity.  
If, in the earlier part  of the decade, MacBeth (1984, p.170) had been right to comment that 
‘the Scottish system is marginally more centralist (in regard to curriculum control, finance 
and the Inspectorate) than is the English’, this was certainly no longer the case by the end of 
the 1980s and into the 1990s.  Although Scotland introduced the 5-14 Curriculum (SOED, 
1994) this was not statutory but ‘national guidelines’ (though it would be a brave 
headteacher who did not accept this guidance) and did not cover the senior phase of 
schooling. Unlike standardised national testing that accompanied the National Curriculum in 
England, the 5-14 curriculum included testing at a number of levels but only when the 
teacher judged the child to be ‘ready’. Children sat five levels of tests (A-E) administered by 
the class teacher, the results of which were widely dismissed as unreliable. 
 
The 1980s: a summary 
Stephen Ball (1997) criticises those researchers who tend to see 1988 as ‘ground zero’ in 
terms of educational policy research. Though he is right to do so, one can see why it  
happened – from the major legislation set out in the UK 1944 act, establishing the modern 
post-war  educational system, until 1988 the broad brush of historical hindsight might 
conclude that very little changed. Though this is far from the truth in one respect the 1988 
Act did represent ground zero: the radical change of direction put a determined full stop to  
the ‘post-war consensus’ which had assumed a gradual and irreversible move towards 
progressive socialism. By the end of the 1980s a set of far-reaching changes profoundly 
changed the shape of the education system, establishing a quasi-market based on choice 
and accountability. As Salter and Tapper (1981, p.49) remarked early on in the decade, ‘we 
may be witnessing something of a contradiction in terms – a state sponsored attempt at 
revolutionary change’. 
It is worth pointing out, however, that the situation was rather different in Scotland. A belief 
in the greater egalitarian nature of Scottish society and an ‘anti-Thatcher rhetoric’ (Arnott 
and Menter, 2007) coupled with greater confidence in the education system, ensured that 
moves towards the market were more muted. Confidence in non-selective secondary 
schools and in the professionalism of teachers remained high and only two schools opted 
out of LA control. This is not to say that the education system in Scotland remained immune 
from the shift to neoliberalism, but that this manifested differently and Scotland’s education 
system, already distinct, continued to diverge from the other UK polities into the 1990s and 
beyond.   
 
The Major years 1990-1997: the turn to (educational) governance 
In 1990 Margaret Thatcher was ousted and replaced by John Major who, against all the 
odds, won the 1992 general election and remained  PM until 1997. Although the style of 
leadership was very different, the overall trajectory remained largely unchanged. It was 
during this decade that the effects of the ERA came to fruition. The apparently paradoxical 
mix of centralising and decentralising measures referred to by Ranson (1986) in analysing 
the  1980 Act was finally named in educational discourse as ‘governance’ by Stephen Ball 
drawing on the etymology of ‘steering’ (Kickert, 1991): 
Steering at a distance is an alternative to coercive/prescriptive control. Constraints 
are replaced by incentives. Prescription is replaced by ex-post accountability based 
upon quality or outcome assessments. Coercion is replaced by self-steering – the 
appearance of autonomy. Opposition or resistance are side-stepped, displaced. (Ball, 
1993, p.111) 
This ‘new paradigm of governance’ (Ball, 1993), arguably initiated in the 1980s in all but 
name, finally established a bridgehead in the educational research literature in the 1990s. 
Ball set this within a conceptual framework of performativity as ‘a more subtle yet more 
totalising form of control of teachers’ (p.111). Although Ball was not the first to draw on 
Foucauldian notions of the technology of the self (see, for example, Broadfoot,1987) he was 
undoubtedly instrumental in opening this up as a most uberous line in educational research 
in the 1990s and into the new millennium. 
The ERA provided educational researchers with fertile ground for empirical work and 
comment (most of it critical) around devolved budgets, grant maintained schools, city 
technology colleges and the marginalisation of LEAs. The notion of the ideology of the 
market is a common theme in these papers, an indicative sample of which is presented 
below. It should be noted that the conclusions drawn by these authors may be contested, 
they are presented here without critical comment to show how discourse at this time was 
being constructed by educational researchers. 
Power et al (1994) examined whether GM schools were realising the aim of diversifying  
educational provision and expanding parental choice. GM schools were promoted by 
government as a means by which parents could ‘escape the policies of Labour controlled 
LEAs’ (p.210) and the authors quote the Centre for Policy Studies as saying ‘many…feel that 
their children are trapped in schools…[which] are being used for the promotion of secular 
and socialist values’ (Centre for Policy Studies,1988, p. 10, quoted in  Power et al, 1994, 
p.210). By side lining the LEA schools, it was argued, would be free to promote their own 
values. For critics the fear was that GM schools would lead to a ‘two tier’ system. Power et 
al quote Jack Straw (then Shadow Education Minister) as saying that the intention of GM 
schools was to undermine comprehensive education and bring about a return to selection 
However, Power et al conclude that the impact of GM schools seems to have been minimal: 
So far, there is not much to indicate that GM status, by itself, is having any significant 
impact on patterns of school choice. It marks neither a widening of choice, nor a 
highly desired alternative.  There is evidence, however, that the conjuncture of GM 
status and selective schooling alters the ability of parents to obtain a place at the 
school of their choice…GM status has on the whole frustrated the realisation of 
choice. (p.223) 
Similarly, Deem et al (1994) conducted a study of school governors in the context of LMS 
arguing that the market ideology caused schools ‘to turn inwards on themselves…examining 
their image and market appeal  [in order to attract the] desirable middle class parent and 
child’ (p.548).  This, they argued, resulted in greater uniformity of school provision. 
Moreover, the scramble for these ‘desirable’ pupils, they claim, effectively reduced choice 
‘for working-class and ethnic minority, parents and pupils’ (p.535). Thus, the aim of the ERA 
to enhance diversity and choice actually resulted in the converse: GM and LMS schools 
tended to stay as they had been or, in the pursuit of the ‘right pupils’ aimed for conformity, 
and thus real choice in a diverse market-place did not materialise (on the other hand neither 
were the fears that GM schools would be a backdoor return to grammar schools).  
Vincent et al (1994) report a study of the effect of LMS on the provision of special 
educational needs (SEN). The legislative framework for SEN provision had been set out in 
the 1981 Education Act, which largely followed the recommendations of the much 
respected (at the time) Warnock Report (DES, 1978) which abolished categories of disability, 
and supported the concept of integration of children with SEN in mainstream schools. The 
Warnock Report asserted that around 20% of pupils could be considered to have SEN, of 
whom 2% would require a ‘statement’ (in Scotland a ‘Record of needs’) and specialised 
support, to be provided by LEAs. Thus, the legislation had been in place for some time 
before the impact of the ERA was felt. The study examined the responses of two LEAs, each 
with its distinctive ‘culture, history and ethos’ (p.265) as they worked to negotiate the 
changes required by the legislation in the light of devolved school budgets. While noting 
that the legislation does not promote a ‘wholly free market’ (pointing to the retention of 
power at the centre), the authors argue that the discourse of the market is pervasive, 
leading to ‘values drift’; and they question whether children with SEN might be ‘weaker 
players in the market-place’ (Vincent et al, 1994, p.264). Though the authors are very critical 
of the outcomes of these changes (especially in relation to the ‘atomisation’ of services) one 
interesting factor emerged as an unanticipated consequence of the Act:  in forcing schools 
to overcome their ‘learned ignorance’ (p.271) and accept their responsibilities in relation to 
the 18% of pupils with SEN but no statement, moves towards greater inclusion of these 
pupils was promoted. In addition, though the ERA further marginalised local authorities they 
proved to be critical to its implementation; and though their actions were necessarily 
constrained by the legislation their differing responses indicate that they were not without 
weight as actors in the policy network. Similarly, in the implementation of the government’s 
plans to open CTCs local authorities exerted considerable influence. In all only 15 CTCs were 
ever built, one of the main problems being the difficulty of securing suitable sites in inner 
cities areas, attempts at which were frequently frustrated by local authorities (Dale, 1989; 
Walford, 2000). 
Evans and Penney (1994, p.520) start from the premise that ‘the whole object of ERA 
reforms has been to change the system of educational governance in England and Wales 
from one where control is exercised by the LEAs to one where market forces reign 
supreme’. They report on the effects of these changes on an advisory and support service 
offered by one LEA to schools.  With LEAs marginalised under a series of Education Acts, 
most notably with budgets for support services being devolved to schools under LMS and  
the elevation of monitoring and inspection over advice, the future of this service looked  
‘particularly bleak’ (p.529). The position of the LEA was further jeopardised by the 1992 
Schools Act which reconfigured   HMI (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate) as the Office for 
Standards in Education (Ofsted). Ofsted  was established as an ‘independent’ inspection 
service awarding contracts on a competitive basis, thereby extending market ideals into the 
inspection process. However, ‘much to the chagrin of the political new right’ (p.529) 90% of 
inspection contracts went to LEAs, including the LEA in Evans and Penney’s study.  
Moreover, this injection enabled the LEA to expand the support side of its work, developing 
services for schools. Thus, the moves intended to side line the LEA were undermined by the 
very office set up by government to do this.  
Typically, educational research was highly critical of the ERA and the market ideology 
promulgated within it. Yet, examining these cases it could be argued that the effects of the 
ERA were not entirely as anticipated.  Why was this? Jonathan (1990) points to the 
incongruity inherent in the ideology of the ‘New Right’, and manifest in the ERA, between 
libertarianism and conservativism: 
The first of these elements embodies an endorsement of competitive individualism 
and implies a reduced role for the state, with the market determining the production 
and distribution of goods – public as well as private, social as well as material…The 
second, conservative, element requires, on the contrary that the state be sufficiently 
strong to maintain property relations and related rights in the situation of unequal 
distribution which is logically required for competition to flourish. (Jonathan, 1990, 
p.17) 
The juxtaposition of these incongruities creates a dialectical tension which emerges in the 
implementation of the ERA and may be considered responsible for the subversion of the 
aims of the legislation. Although dialectic has no clear and unambiguous meaning Schneider 
(1971, p.667) identifies a number of ‘meaning clusters’ that are relevant for social scientists, 
including: unanticipated consequences; adaptations that once made obstruct more effective 
ones; contradiction, paradox and negation; goal shifts; and the dissolution of conflict in the 
coalescence of opposites, from which list it can be seen that the reflexive moment of 
reversal inherent in dialectic is an essentially ironic movement. Each of the subversions in 
the empirical studies outlined above embodies an aspect of this dialectical irony.  
 
The same dialectical tension inhabits ‘governance’ itself. As noted earlier, Lobel (2012) 
characterises ‘the new governance’  as a response to the failure of both top down command 
and control government and unregulated markets. This gives rise to the apparently 
contradictory mix of centralising and decentralising policies that effectively constitute 
‘steering at a distance’.  In establishing governance as a new political theory, Rhodes (1996, 
p.660; original emphasis) defined ‘Anglo-governance’ as referring to ‘self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks’ incorporating a range of policy actors from private, public and 
voluntary sectors and argues that: 
 
Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-organising. Although the 
state does not occupy a privileged, sovereign position, it can directly and imperfectly 
steer networks. 
 
Rhodes argues that the growth of networks decentres and diminishes the state and quotes 
Kickert (1993) in saying that as a result of this ‘Government does not have enough power to 
exert its will on other actors’. This is the ‘hollowing out of the state’ thesis (Peters, 1994). 6 
As Rhodes (1996, p.662) notes, ‘steering complex sets of organizations is difficult’. But it is 
not just that it is hard to do, steering at a distance embodies a paradoxical conjunction of 
hierarchy, markets and networks. Given this dialectical tension, the opportunity for ironic 
reversals of all kinds is inescapable. Indeed, Hogwood (1997, p.708) comments that: ‘One of 
the ironies of the Conservative government has been that, in its concern to roll back the 
frontiers of state (to say nothing of the constant theme of de-regulation), it has presided 
over the greatest extension of formal regulation of any postwar government’. In fact, other 
commentators, have rebutted the ‘hollowing out’ thesis, arguing that far from a hollowing 
out there has been a ‘filling in’ (Taylor, 2000) – or rather, in another ironic move, the hollow 
core of the governance network is occupied by government. 
 
The 1990s: a summary 
It is in the educational research literature of the 1990s that the turn to governance is 
evident. A shift in usage from governance as ‘school governance’ (the functioning of boards) 
to its re-conceptualisation as the development of regulatory strategies by the State of 
complex educational systems emerges: the language of ‘steering’ becomes common, as 
does the concept of the network.  Yet it is also evident that steering of increasingly 
fragmented systems allows considerable room for the subversion and undermining of the 
command structures at the centre.  Thus, many of the provisions of the ERA failed to 
achieve what they set out to (Pierson, 1998). Yet, under successive Conservative 
Governments the introduction of a market ideology, flawed as it was, led to fundamental 
changes in governance which were sustained and arguably strengthened by the incoming 
New Labour administration, leading to a widespread belief in the ‘naturalisation’ of 
neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
 
New Labour 1997-2010: partnership and performativity 
The 1997 election was won by the Labour party (led by Tony Blair, PM from 1997-2007), 
now dubbed ‘New Labour’ to dissociate itself from the entryist ‘Militant Tendency’ that had 
attempted to subvert the party from within in the previous decade. The foundations of 
governance had been laid down in the moves to neoliberalism7 by successive Conservative 
governments. How, and to what extent, was this continued by the incoming Blair 
administration? Certainly, the commitment to markets was maintained. Davies (2005, 
p.316) quotes Blair as saying: ‘the best way to promote efficiency in production is through 
competition, liberalization and open markets’. But there was a shift in tone. For Blair the 
market could be harnessed towards meeting social objectives: ‘entrepreneurial zeal’ Blair 
said, ‘can promote social justice’ (Davies, 2005, p.316). This was the idea that lay at the 
heart of the ‘Third Way’, the term Blair adopted to distinguish New Labour’s ideological 
stance of centre right economics and centre left social policy, both from previous Labour 
governments and the outgoing Conservative administration. Powell (2000, p.51) quotes the 
Department of Social Security policy document New Ambitions for Our Country (DSS, 1998, 
p. 19), as saying the Third Way ‘is about combining public and private provision in a new 
partnership for the new age’. Indeed, ‘partnership’ was the watchword, underpinning a 
commitment to multi-level governance, part of an integrated process providing, as Blair was 
fond of saying, ‘joined up solutions to joined up problems’(Taylor, 2000, p.56). Although 
educational research tends to situate Third Way-ism as an essentially UK phenomenon, 
Johnson and Tonkiss (2002) argue that it had important antecedents in Australian 
governments of 1983-1996. Third-Wayism thus provides an early example of ‘travelling 
policy’, a concept in educational policy research which gathered pace through the 2000s and 
into the 2010s as interest in the global nature of educational governance increased. 
 
The New Labour government introduced a wide range of measures aimed at promoting 
participation and collaboration between diverse stakeholders (Davies, 2005). Yet the 
accumulation of regulatory powers to central government continued as further evidence of 
the ‘filling in of the state’ (Taylor, 2000). Stoker (2002) refers to New Labour’s approach as 
‘governance by lottery’, in which ‘winners and losers are selected by chance but in which no 
one has come up with the big prize’ (p.418). Further, Stoker argues that this was not about 
‘unintended consequences undermining grand reforms’, but a deliberate strategy arising as 
a direct result of the ‘what works’ pragmatism inhabiting the Third Way, and as a means by 
which to manage the tensions within it. Stoker points to a plethora of initiatives resulting in 
a  ‘Byzantine structure of plans, zones, and separate financial pots (Stoker, 2002, p.424). 
Harris and Ranson (2005) list among these Excellence in Cities (EiCs), Schools Facing 
Challenging Circumstances (SFCC) and Educational Action Zones (EAZs), all of which required 
the formation of partnerships between the public and private sectors.  Similarly, Powell 
(2000, p.57) refers to the Third Way as a ‘pick and mix strategy, largely defined by what it is 
not’ and he draws on Marx’s famous dictum that history repeats itself, the first time as 
tragedy and the second time as farce. It is worth quoting Marx (correctly)  in order to 
appreciate the appositeness of Powell’s observation: 
 
Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, 
so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as 
farce…Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past. (Marx, 1852, np) 
 
If ‘governance’ under the Conservative neoliberal regime had negotiated a tension between 
hierarchy and markets,  Third Way neoliberalism manifested a certain element of ‘paranoia’  
in  its simultaneous strategies of ‘hierarchical control and egalitarian partnership’ (Stoker, 
2002). Stoker goes on, ‘That both strategies are tried and directed at certain groups reflects 
New Labour’s deep fatalistic streak and uncertainty about which strategy will work’ (Stoker, 
2002, p.432). Viewed in this light the Third Way starts to take on a distinctly Kafkaesque 
hue. 
 
Education was at the sharp end of much of this conjunction of  ‘hierarchical control and 
egalitarian partnership’. During the election campaign, Labour Party leader, Tony Blair 
famously declared that his three priorities were ‘education, education, education’.8 
Education was seen to be the main route by which social justice could be achieved, 
following the precepts of the ‘school effectiveness movement’ it was believed that schools 
could make a difference − and hence should be held accountable for performance (see 
Chitty, 1997b, for a critique). If some may have hoped that an incoming Labour government 
might undo much of the previous administration’s legislation, they were to be disappointed, 
if not in the detail at least in the overall direction of travel. The White Paper Excellence in 
Schools (Department for Education and Employment, 1997) set out the Government’s 
position on education, subsequently enacted as the 1998 School Standards and Frameworks 
Act. The focus was to be on ‘standards not structures’ and there would be ‘zero tolerance of 
underperformance’ (p.5); literacy and numeracy hours were introduced and for the first 
time teachers would be told how, as well as what, to teach;  ‘Performance data’ would be 
published ‘as a spur to improve performance’ for the benefit of parents; and, the 
government promised,  ‘We will publish more such data than ever before’ (p.25). For the 
first time too, league tables would include a measure of the ‘value added’ to pupil 
achievement by the school, and ‘benchmark data’ would allow comparison with other 
schools (p.25).  
 
Performance and partnership underpinned New Labour’s programme of  ‘modernisation’– 
modernisation in this context meaning the extension of hierarchical controls (Tomlinson, 
2003). Modernisation was aimed at improving the performance of LEAs, teachers and the 
curriculum.  LEAs had been marginalised by successive Conservative governments and under 
New Labour their role was further circumscribed. LEAs were closely directed by central 
government and their actions became subject to inspection. Tomlinson (2003, p.200) quotes 
a speech made by Tony Blair in 1998 in which he warns, ‘If you [local government] are 
unwilling to work to the modern agenda, then government will look for other partners’. 
Modernisation of the teaching profession included performance related pay and the 
introduction of national competence standards; while modernisation of the curriculum 
included a narrowing of subject areas, more testing, and a greater focus on literacy and 
numeracy.  
 
On the other hand modernisation of partnership included the ‘redesign’ of the public as 
‘active users who influence service design and planning’ (Ozga, 2002, p.332), alongside a 
redefined role for business. Ozga points to social capital (SC) theory as underpinning many 
of the policies framing the partnership agenda. Social capital theory, as an academic 
construct  concerned with networks and norms of reciprocity, enjoyed immense popularity 
in the latter half of the 1990s and into the 2000s but it was also ‘one of the most popular 
exports from sociological theory into everyday language’ (Portes, 1998, p.2). Thus, 
 
Social capital theory acts as a powerful connecting device that links new forms of 
governance preoccupied with the measurement and improvement of performance 
to the constitution of society as a governable domain. (Ozga, 2002, p.333)  
 
In this way governance itself was to be modernised, creating a new fusion between public 
and private (Ozga, 2002). Nowhere was this more evident than in the setting up of EAZs, 
intended to increase the SC of families living in disadvantaged areas. Are EAZs, Power and 
Whitty (1999, p.542) ask, ‘the Third Way in action?’  
EAZs were a prime example of Stoker’s (2002) ‘governance by lottery’. Partnerships, which 
could include schools, the LEA, local and national businesses, the training and enterprise 
council, religious bodies, voluntary and community organisations, and other local 
government agencies (DfEE, 1997), could bid competitively for EAZ status and were funded 
to the tune of £500-£750k per annum (Gewirtz et al, 2005). EAZs typically consisted of 
around 20 local primary and secondary schools and their associated partners, headed by an 
EA Forum (EAF) intended to enable non-professionals to assume key roles in leading change 
(Ozga, 2002). Ozga quotes the DfEE who argued that EAZs would work precisely because 
they would bring  ‘new skills, experience, funding and radical ways of working with 
educators’ (DfEE, 1997; quoted in Ozga, 2002, p.337). 
EAZs were heralded at the outset as a ‘flagship’ policy. Gewirtz et al (2005, p. 328) quote 
influential New Labour politician, Margaret Hodge, as saying, ‘the development of the Third 
Way is perhaps best seen in the development of education action zones’. It was a relatively 
short-lived scheme, however. Announced in 1998, 25 EAZs were set up in 1998/9; 48 more 
followed in the next two years, but by 2005 all (statutory) EAZs had been incorporated into 
the next (non-statutory) initiative, ‘Excellence in Cities’. What were the reasons for the 
relative failure of this emblematic policy? Power and Whitty wrote presciently in 1999, that 
‘the new “synergy” between public and private may bring additional resources to zones but 
it may also bring together a variety of agendas that are far from complementary’ (Power 
and Whitty, 1999, p.544), and this proved to be the case. EAZs arguably collapsed under the 
weight of their own internal dialectical tensions. In the normative discourse of partnership 
the presence of conflict is under-recognised and certainly under-theorised: Davies (2004) 
writes that dominant patterns observed in partnerships are hierarchical and agonistic rather 
than coordinating. By unpicking the constituent elements in an empirical study of three 
EAZs, Jones and Bird (2000) highlight the delicate balancing act entered into by 
public/private partnerships and the competing tensions this gives rise to. They describe a 
‘tangled unevenly resourced complex of interests’ for which the term ‘partnership’ ‘does 
not seem to describe the processes that result’ (Jones and Bird, 2000, p.504). 
Gewirtz et al (2005) draw on social capital theory to explain the failure of EAZs to achieve 
their aims. They conclude that many of the schemes failed to engage with the parents and 
families they were set up to help. Certainly, EAFs did not reflect the composition of the 
communities they represented, and, being largely composed of white, male professionals 
served to enhance the SC of the ‘already network rich’ (p.659). Moreover, the strong 
bonding SC that existed within local working class communities, Gewirtz et al argue,  worked 
actively against the cultivation of other forms of SC, notably bridging and linking SC.  
Bonding SC creates strong ties within groups but can be an exclusionary force. Bridging and 
linking SC are weaker forces but serve to connect groups outwards and upwards 
respectively: 
Although bridging and linking ties are weaker in the sense that they are likely to be 
less intimate than bonding ties, they provide access to valued forms of economic and 
cultural capital – a paradox capture in Granovetter’s (1973) phrase ‘the strength of 
weak ties’. (Gewirtz et al, 2005, p.668) 
Not all weak ties are strong, however. Davies (2004) also draws on Granovetter’s term in 
attempting to understand why the ‘constant flow of urban policy initiatives to promote 
collaboration have not generated strong institutions based on informal modes of constraint’ 
(p.570). Davies points to the ‘endogenous tensions’ that lead to dysfunctionality and self-
destruction. Partnerships are frequently hierarchical in nature and characterised by ‘weak-
weak’ ties between actors which do not provide effective bridges. Thus, while a logic of 
collaboration was evident among the political elites it was less strongly replicated in the 
business community. 
As with the measures introduced by the ERA, New Labour’s EAZs largely failed to achieve 
their ends. Research indicates too the failure of Labour’s Academies (schools independent 
of local authority control and usually sponsored by business) to achieve their goals of 
‘breaking the cycle’  of underachievement in socially and economically deprived areas 
(Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004). Though at the outset government claimed 
significant improvement in attainment over a very short period for this initiative, analysis by 
Gorard  (2005) indicates that where exam results had improved this could be almost entirely 
attributed to subtle changes in pupil intake that had resulted as an unanticipated outcome 
of policy. Gorard refers to this as ‘sleight of hand school improvement’ (p.376). 
 
Performance 
If partnership was emblematic of the Third Way, it seems that this was just a distraction 
from the main event. Gewirtz et al (2004, p.328) quote a civil servant who claimed that EAZs 
were ‘simply one of a number of initiatives the government was trying out’ while the ‘core 
agenda’ was performance (though this may have been putting an acceptable spin on the 
failure of EAZs post hoc). If partnership could be said to be concerned with structure, 
performance was squarely about standards, effectively inaugurating what Stephen Ball 
(2000) referred to as ‘the performativity society’ (a clear manifestation of the paranoia 
Stoker was referring to): 
 
Performativity is a technology, a culture and mode of regulation, or a system of 
‘terror’ in Lyotard’s words, that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as 
means of control, attrition and change. (Ball, 2000, p.1) 
 
New Labour’s focus on standards and performance proved fruitful ground for educational 
researchers and common themes emerged in the literature drawing on Foucauldian notions 
of ‘technologies of the self’. Performativity thus implies an ‘internalised disposition’ of 
accountability, in which ‘routines of performance surveillance bite deeply into the attitudes, 
practices, and identities of state professionals’ (Ranson, 2003, p.469). Thus, under New 
Labour there was an intensification of neoliberal regimes of governance, as grotesque 
parody (echoing Marx’s dictum), in comparison with which previous Conservative 
administrations end up looking quite amateur.  
Gleeson and Gunter (2001) comment on the shift in New Labour’s approach from external 
to internal accountability. They argue that the  ERA (1988) failed to achieve its objectives 
due to the lack of a policy mechanism to deliver ‘its oppressive mix of prescription, tests and 
inspection’ (p.147). New Labour, by contrast, instigated different mechanisms of 
performance management to deliver its own oppressive mix. Among the policies introduced 
by New Labour to increase internal accountability was ‘Threshold Assessment’ (TA), set out 
in the Green Paper, Teachers meeting the challenge of change (DfEE, 1998). This paper 
outlined a number of initiatives aimed at raising teacher performance but none was more 
contentious than TA. TA was a system of annual appraisal linked to a pay policy that 
rewarded ‘good performance’ (Mahony et al, 2004): 
From induction up to Threshold, teachers progress by yearly increment. Threshold is 
highly significant as the point at which, normally after five years, teachers submit 
themselves to an assessment process…If teachers meet the Threshold standards 
they receive, in the form of a performance related promotion, an additional £2000 
pa and transfer to an upper pay spine (UPS). (Mahony et al, 2004, p.445) 
Gleeson and Gunter (2001) argue that this acted as more than mere incentivisation of the 
teaching profession.  Rather, policy was aimed at the creation of new professional 
subjectivities through the internalisation of measurable performance standards. It 
represented, in Stephen Ball’s (2003) memorable phrase, ‘the struggle over the teacher’s 
soul’ ─ the apotheosis of ‘steering at a distance’.  
Mahony et al (2004) carried out empirical research with teachers subjected to TA. While 
three of their participants viewed TA as a positive experience of professional development 
the remaining 42 did not, though many complied with its terms. Mahony et al (2004, p.461) 
conclude that TA ‘carries a clear danger that other elements of what is educationally 
important will either be regarded as marginal or felt to be in conflict with teachers’ personal 
and professional values’. To this extent, the re-shaping of professional subjectivities may be 
said to embody a degree of what Ball (2000) refers to as ‘fabrication’ as an ‘accommodation 
towards performativity’ (p.5): 
There is a splitting between the teachers own judgements about ‘good practice’ and 
students ‘needs’ on the one hand and the rigours of performance on the other. (Ball, 
2000, p.6; original emphasis) 
Once again, however, the situation was rather different in Scotland. During the New Labour 
era Scotland (and to a lesser extent Wales) became devolved polities.9 UK governance 
relationships were significantly altered and educational policy continued to diverge in 
Scotland. A key difference in the approach taken in Scotland arose through the report of the 
McCrone committee (SEED, 2001). In contrast to England, the McCrone settlement included 
a big upfront pay increase for teachers, a 35-hour working week, and a cut in class contact 
time (with the freedom to undertake duties outwith the classroom at a time and place of 
the teacher’s choosing). A Masters-level ‘Chartered teacher’ qualification, was introduced 
which any teacher at the top of the main salary scale could undertake and which led to 
entry to a higher pay scale. Significantly, Chartered teacher status did not carry any 
additional statutory duties or responsibilities.  
The ‘McCrone agreement’ needs to be seen in the context of its historical antecedents, 
which included unrest in the profession over workload issues and concerns over the supply 
and retention of teachers (Draper and Sharp, 2006). There was also a concern that the 
profession had suffered as a result of increases in centralisation and a reduction in 
professional autonomy and the report was therefore concerned to ‘restore’ teacher 
professionalism. Ironically, perhaps, it did this through contractually obliging teachers to 
undertake 35 hours of continuing professional development (CPD) per annum. Though 
teachers welcomed the pay increase (around 10% for most) others of its changes 
(particularly CPD and Chartered Teacher status) proved divisive.  
More recently (though I am getting a bit ahead of myself here, encroaching on the 2010s), 
the influential policy document Teaching Scotland’s future (Donaldson, 2010) and the follow 
up document, Advancing professionalism in teaching (Scottish Government, 2011, 
‘McCormac Review’),  have sought to  re-narrativise McCrone as having done harm to the 
professionalism of teachers (and little to enhance the learning of pupils). Both reports call 
for a change in the nature of teacher professionalism. Donaldson talks of ‘enhanced 
professionalism’ the ‘extended professional’ and ‘twenty-first century professionalism’ – a 
professionalism that goes above and beyond and is not contractually based. In the light of 
this, the General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) has assiduously recast teacher 
professional development − or what it now calls ‘professional learning’ − as a teacher’s right, 
rather than an obligation (Watson and Michael, 2016). Indeed, the appraisal process, in 
Scotland called ‘Professional Review and Development’ (PRD) carried out against a suite of 
professional standards,10 is determinedly developmental: 
Where it operates successfully, professional review and development (PRD), is 
understood as an entitlement of all teachers which assists them to reflect on their 
practice and to consider how they can improve their professional skills and 
knowledge. (GTCS, nd; emphasis added). 
 
However, recognising that the implementation of PRD has been undeniably  patchy it was 
announced by the Scottish Government, in 2012,  that teachers would henceforth be 
required to maintain ‘active registration’ with the GTCS through a process of ‘re-
accreditation’  (rapidly renamed  ‘Professional Update’ by the GTCS). Under this process, 
every person registered with the GTCS  must undergo professional update (PU) every five 
years in order to remain on the register of the GTCS and, therefore, licensed to practice. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, this too is largely seen as a supportive process rather than an 
unwarranted extension of managerialism (Watson and Fox, 2015). In this way, the 
cultivation of professional subjectivities has followed a rather different path in Scotland in 
which teachers view PRD and PU as part of a process of continual professional learning. 
Indeed, a study of early career teachers indicated the strong desire this group of teachers 
had to ‘continuously develop themselves’ following the precepts set out in the newly 
introduced GTCS  Standard for Career Long Professional Learning (Watson and Drew, 2014). 
It may be tempting to view the situation in Scotland through a rosy lens (especially from the 
vantage point of England) but this would be to misunderstand the extent and nature of 
managerialism which has clearly adopted a more Deleuzian form of control based on desire 
(as plenitude), in contrast to the overtly Foucauldian disciplinary route taken in England 
(Watson, 2010). Thus cultural differences shape responses to global forces in different ways. 
 
Summary of the 2000s 
Power and Whitty (1999, p.542) cite Anthony Giddens in asserting that the Third Way, 
involves moving beyond the old dualism between state and civil society - in which 
government is either the solution or the problem, and accepting a new version of 
government which will renew civil society through increased democratization, 
greater transparency and experiments with democracy. 
Yet, they also note that much of New Labour’s educational policy was a continuation of the 
market ideology put in place by the previous Conservative governments, and they suggest 
that Michael Novak may be nearer the mark in his comment that, ‘the triumph of Tony Blair 
may in one sense be regarded as the triumph of Margaret Thatcher’ (Novak,1999, p.89). 
Thus neoliberalism continued to, forge ahead ‘never arriving at its stated destination, and 
never knowing where to stop’ (Peck, 2010, p.7). What also starts to become clear in reading 
the educational research literature of the 2000s is the location of educational policy within a 
wider globalised context of neoliberal  ‘modernisation’ as a result of the rise to prominence 
of the OECD and other transnational spaces of governance. This is explored further in the 
final section of this paper.  
 
2010s and the return to Conservatism: globalisation, digitisation and ‘New spaces of 
governance’ 
Despite the continuing reverberations of the 2008 Crash which caused severe economic 
shock around the globe, reports of the death of capitalism proved to be exaggerated. The 
incoming Conservative/Liberal Coalition government of 2010, led by David Cameron, took 
up where New Labour left off and in terms of educational policy  Avis (2011) notes, that the 
continuities far exceeded the ruptures. Thus, Michael Gove, Education Secretary from 2010-
2014, extended the Academies scheme of independently funded schools set up by New 
Labour (itself an extension of the old Conservative CTCs), enabling fast track measures that 
could circumvent usual local democratic procedures. With apparently no irony, John Bangs,  
head of education at the National Union of Teachers, is reported as saying in the Guardian 
newspaper,  ‘This is astonishing: it is more centralised than anything that Labour ever 
considered’ (Shepherd, 2010, np). Gove also announced a programme of ‘Free schools’ 
(State schools independent of LA control, modelled on US Charter schools), set up where 
there was parental demand which the DfE (2010) claimed would ‘enable excellent teachers 
to create schools to improve standards for all children’. Gove was, in Gillard’s (2016) words, 
‘a man in a hurry’. In explaining the urgency of his task, Gove said in a speech: 
 For all the well-intentioned efforts of past governments, we are still falling further 
behind the best-performing school systems in the world. In Shanghai and Singapore, 
South Korea and Hong Kong – indeed even in Taiwan and Vietnam – children are 
learning more and performing better with every year that passes, leaving our 
children behind in the global race. (Adams,2013, np)  
With this remark Gove encapsulated the globally competitive nature of education, within a 
discourse mediated by the OECD and other transnational organisations. Undoubtedly, the 
most influential of these supranational organisations is the OECD. The OECD was formed in 
1961 as a club of rich nations of the global North (Sellar and Lingard, 2013). The mission of 
the OECD is,’to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of 
people around the world’ (OECD, nd). In commenting on this Rizvi and Lingard (2006) note a 
tension between a market-led orientation originating in the US and a social orientation 
influenced by Europe, but observe that in the current decade neoliberal precepts have 
‘triumphed’.  
 With hindsight, it is possible to see the influence of the OECD in educational policy 
extending back several decades, though this did not feature to any great extent in the 
research literature. In particular, the 1970s saw moves towards the development of a set of 
‘educational indicators’ designed to enable international comparisons and to elucidate 
causal relationships between social/cultural factors and economic progress (Olkinuora, 
1973).This project has continued and the results published annually (since 1992) in the 
OECD’s  Education at a glance. Although designed to give information at the level of the 
nation state, the OECD now recognises that sub-national data are useful to government and 
institutions and hence the 2017 issue says (OECD, 2017, p.14): 
There is increasing recognition that many important features of the development, 
functioning and impact of education systems can only be assessed through an 
understanding of learning outcomes and their relationships to inputs and processes 
at the level of individuals and institutions. To account for this, the indicator 
framework distinguishes between a macro-level, two meso-levels and a micro-level 
of education systems. These relate to: the education system as a whole; the 
educational institutions and providers of educational services; the instructional 
setting and the learning environment within the   institutions; [and] the individual 
participants in education and learning. 
 
Although the indicators cover a range of factors (including the characteristics of school 
systems and a range of social/economic factors) it is the indicators related to learning 
outcomes that have grabbed the headlines. Most notably the international tests that 
constitute ‘PISA’ (Programme for International Student Assessment), the triennial 
educational survey used to determine student performance in maths, science and literacy in 
member countries and associated partners. This move by the OECD assured its importance 
in the global policy domain, helping to raise its status from think tank to policy actor (Rizvi 
and Lingard, 2006). The first round of PISA was carried out in 2000 and in 2002 education 
achieved the status of permanent Directorate for Education and Skills from which base its 
influence has spread.  In 2005 Lingard et al argued that the OECD’s global educational policy 
field was ‘inchoate’, in the current decade we can probably say it has pretty well achieved 
choateness.  
While the purpose of the OECD is ostensibly to provide member and partner countries with 
the resources they need to make effective education policy decisions to meet economic and 
social welfare goals, the emergence of PISA has effectively enabled governments to use 
international comparison as a key instrument of governance in its own right.  In particular, 
the mediocre standing of the UK in relation to ‘emerging nations’ has been used to 
construct a rhetoric of education in crisis and so to legitimate changes intended to reverse 
the UK’s ‘poor performance’, as Gove’s comment attests. Lawn and Grek  (2012, p.7) write, 
‘today, when the future can no longer be organised through meaningful projects by 
government, numerical data becomes a useful substitute for ideas’. This is ‘governing by 
numbers’ (Ozga and Lingard, 2007). 
This trend has been further intensified as a result of the development of PISA-based  tests 
for schools, which have opened up local spaces to OECD influence, ‘indigeniz[ing] global 
developments to the local, while also externalizing comparisons of performance’  (Lewis et 
al, 2016, p.29). This enfolding of the local and the global, by-passing the nation state, has led 
to the development of more complex ontological conceptualisations of the spatialities of 
governance. While the OECD talks of ‘multi level governance’ (OECD, 2016) (a term which 
started to gain currency in the research literature in the 2000s), Lingard and Sellar (2014) go 
beyond a scalar conceptualisation and talk about the growth of topological spaces of 
governance and the ‘powers of reach’ of organisations such as the OECD across time and 
space. This leads to a radical reconceptualisation of possibilities for action around 
measurement and comparison thereby creating new connections, ‘producing a space of 
commensurability that relates each system (or indeed school) to others’ (Lewis et al, 2016, 
p.35). These complex virtual spaces of governance have very real effects on teachers’ 
practices through the ways in which pupils are taken apart and re-assembled (in yet another 
irony, the ‘child at the centre’ becomes dispersed as a series of codes). In effect, pupils are 
becoming ‘machine readable’ (Williamson, 2016a) – and PISA-shaped.  
Although PISA is the best known global education data system other policy instruments 
make use of the affordances provided by ‘big data’, enabling the emergence of  digital 
spaces of governance. Key among these in the UK are the National Pupil Database (NPD) and 
Ofsted’s ‘School Data Dashboard’ package. Since 2002, the NPD has collected data on the 
educational progress of pupils from early years to higher education. The NPD currently has 
information on around 7 million pupils, collecting information ‘as traces of data that can be 
standardised, joined together and aggregated with a national population data-set’ 
(Williamson, 2016a, p.129). Ofsted’s ‘School Data Dashboard’ package provides schools with 
an analysis of performance based on inspection data. As a result of this, school inspection 
itself is being shaped by data collection techniques ‘crafted through the technical expertise 
of data software developers whose very existence is hidden behind the apparently objective 
surfaces and interfaces of the data itself’ (Williamson, 2016a, p.130). Thus global ‘edu-
businesses’ are able to exert considerable influence in the field of educational governance. 
Hogan (2016) points to the increasing involvement of global companies, most notably 
Pearson, in the development and implementation of national testing regimes in countries 
such as Australia, USA and the UK. In this way edu-businesses are able, she warns, to ‘shape 
education policy problems and determine their solution in ways that are commercially 
beneficial to themselves or shareholders’ (Hogan, 2016, p.98). 
Increasingly, these new spaces of governance are becoming insinuated into individual 
learners as ‘learning analytics’, based on performance in online learning systems, providing 
‘real time’ feedback to learners. Thus, where Ozga and Lingard (2007) refer to ‘governing by 
numbers’, Williamson (2016b, p.45) argues we are witnessing moves to ‘governing by 
algorithm’: 
While governing by numbers seeks to collect and analyse learners’ performance data 
in order to cast a grid of statistical calculation and comparability over national 
education systems, governing by algorithm involves the deployment of advanced 
software technologies to ‘know’ and on that basis to forecast, predict and automate 
appropriate pedagogies to instruct the individual learner. 
Wilson et al (2017) caution against practices which reduce individual learners to a set of 
metrics which purport to  ‘individualise’ learning arguing that, conversely, such practices are 
reductive and influence learning and teaching in unknowable ways. This points to an urgent 
need to better understand the influence of these forms of ‘micro level’ governance through 
empirical research (Selwyn et al, 2015; Robert-Holmes and Bradbury, 2017).  
The complex shifts evident in educational governance reflect those in social policy systems 
more broadly as moves towards more heterarchical forms of governance lead to altered 
relationships between governments and civil society. This has entailed a growing 
privatisation of formerly national welfare systems and the rise of what has been termed 
‘philanthrocapitalism’ as billionaires such as Bill Gates aim to ‘privatise good’ in addressing 
the major social and environmental challenges facing the planet (Bishop and Green, 2015, p. 
544).  The role of philanthrocapitalism is clearly evident in education in the UK (Olmedo, 
2014). Thus  ‘Academy chains’ of schools set up and owned  by ostensibly philanthropic 
organisations are able to subvert the usual democratic processes thereby blurring lines of 
accountability (Wilkins, 2012). The philanthrogovernance of Academy chains is creating new 
and interesting relationships between schools and the state. While academies must operate 
within national policy, powerful actants are able to leverage influence over governments 
thus rendering the question of steering at a distance rather ambiguous – who, these days, is 
steering whom? 
It should be noted, however, that this is a distinctly English concern. In other parts of the 
UK, most notably Scotland, the experimental dismantling of the education system has not 
occurred. Education has remained largely under the control of central government working 
in conjunction with LAs. A recent shakeup of governance has tended to consolidate this with 
the establishment of six Regional Improvement Collaboratives, comprising representatives 
of LAs and Education Scotland staff, led by a government appointed Regional Director with 
the aim of pursuing a ‘relentless focus on improvement’ (Scottish Government, 2017).  
Summary of the 2010s 
During the 2000s, but particularly the 2010s educational governance research has tended to 
focus on the global sphere and the growth of digital data giving rise to an era of ‘test based 
accountability’.  In this way the ontological conceptualisation of  governance has undergone 
extensive remodelling from a largely linear system of hierarchy, to a scalar ‘multi level’ 
system, and hence  to a topological model reaching out across space and time and involving 
transnational institutions and commercial edu-businesses. With these processes national 
governments can be both steered and by-passed simultaneously through the affordances 
provided by digital data. In this way the reach of governance has been extended and deeply 
interpolated into the realm of the individual.   
Higham (2014, p.417) quotes John Coles, former Director General of Schools at the DfE, as 
asking at a British Educational Leadership and Research Society (Blemas) seminar in London 
in 2013, ‘who cares who runs schools?’ In the 1970s the question had been ‘who should 
control our schools?’ (Glatter, 1976), thereby encapsulating the profound shift in 
educational governance that has occurred in this period. The consequences of all this we do 
not know, though it is a likely bet that many of these will be unintended.  
Conclusions 
Even a paper of this length cannot explore all events in detail, and hence this account is 
necessarily partial. But it was never the intention of this piece to give an exhaustive account. 
Rather its aim was to provide an historical examination of relations between governance 
and educational policy; and more broadly, to produce insights into processes of educational 
policy change.   
Educational governance has here been represented as a trajectory from its beginnings in the 
accountability movement; to the development of a market for education; changes in 
regulatory controls and centre/periphery relations leading to ‘steering at a distance’; the 
rise of partnership and networks; and the development of transformed and transformative 
ontologies of governance. Governance has thus developed from a set of externalised 
regulatory controls by which to hold others to account, to a complex mesh of external and 
internal mechanisms subtly (and not so subtly) steering institutions and individuals. What 
lessons can be drawn from this? In developing this metanarrative I have identified ‘ground 
zero’ as the accountability movement in the 1970s, and especially the triumph of a certain 
form of accountability, in a general way located in Halpin’s (1979) ‘being accountable’ 
(rather than ‘offering an account’), and in particular ‘economic’ (Elliott, 1979) or 
‘technocratic’ (MacDonald 1978) accountability. Of course, that there is a beginning is a 
narrative conceit, any historical account starts in medias res, but nonetheless accountability 
within the context of the global embrace of neoliberalism offers a reasonable starting point.  
The growth of economic/technocratic accountability in the 1970s began a process which has 
altered the relationship between teachers and pupils such that pupils have become the 
instruments by which teachers and schools enact performativity. The shift towards a 
marketised education system in the 1980s strengthened this commodification of pupils and 
further necessitated the measurement and the gathering of data which has continued and 
intensified since as we have moved from the realm of the nation state to transnational 
spaces of governance.   
The key question for educationists in all this is what is the influence of such shifts in 
governance on educational practices? This is a question that cries out for a programme of 
rigorous empirical research. In the past decade educational systems have become spaces for 
the collection of data, governed by the invisible algorithms which shape data consumption 
and production (Williamson, 2016b) and this is having far-reaching effects on practices of 
teaching and learning.  Indeed, there are indications (so far anecdotal) that teachers no 
longer see teaching as the inculcation of formal knowledge and skills, but instead as a series 
of manoeuvres by which to ‘track and monitor’ pupils (Watson, 2018). The datafication of 
education is likely to continue: already we see the emergence of research around  
‘neurosensing’ devices which purport to monitor student cognitive activities directly 
(Williamson, 2017). In light of such developments it is timely to reflect on MacDonald’s 
(1978) prescient warning of the ‘tunnels to dystopia’ promised by the growth of the 
accountability movement.  
The anxieties aroused by this Brave New World scenario are perhaps best countered by the 
second, more comic, theme that has emerged from this historical romp: the revelation that 
policies fail while politics is the art of concealing this fact. This was exemplified  here 
through the Conservative’s Educational Reform Act (1988) and New Labour’s educational 
action zones (Gewirtz et al, 2005). That policy fails to achieve its aims is not a particularly  
interesting or novel idea, perhaps. Jessop (2003, p.106) comments ‘markets, states and 
governance all fail’ ─ if only because there are so many more opportunities for things to go 
wrong than to go right. Jessop points to two kinds of governance failures: the failure of 
policy within a mode of governance, and the failure of the mode of governance itself. And 
he outlines three sources of this failure: first, the nature of capitalism and its dependence  
on the  ‘contradictory balance between marketised and non-marketised  organisational 
forms’ (p.105); second, the tensions arising from  unequal and incommensurate 
partnerships; and third,  incomplete knowledge of the situation to be governed. All three 
have been clearly revealed in this review of the research around educational governance. 
But as this paper has repeatedly shown, it is not just that governance fails but that the 
inherent dialectical tension within any mode of governance inevitably gives rise to a 
moment of ironic reversal from which emerges the unanticipated consequence. The 
unanticipated consequence has long been a concern among eminent thinkers (Merton, 
1936, lists among these Machiavelli, Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber). A cynical eye 
might see in all this a grim humour as the manifestation of the Law of Irony ─ ‘the concrete 
realisation of the absurd’ (Amiel, 1905, np). The tendency towards the absurd is scarcely 
surprising when one considers that crisis and failure are what drive the globalised neoliberal 
project towards its idealised, yet unattainable destination (Peck, 2010). (In yet another 
ironic twist we call this ‘progress’). In this way we come to the realisation that governance 
and neoliberalism are inextricably entwined and so ‘the failure-governance waltz keeps on 
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